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How Lehman Brothers Used Repo 105 to Manipulate
Their Financial Statements
Agatha E. Jeffers
Montclair State University

The questionable accounting technique, known as Repo 105, allowed Lehman Brothers to temporarily
appear healthier in the eyes of its investors, creditors and other interested parties. These material
transactions had the ability to affect the decisions of prudent persons. Nevertheless, Lehman failed to
disclose these transactions in the notes to their financial statements and in their filings to the SEC. In this
paper, an examination is made of whether Repo 105 transactions were properly recorded and disclosed
in Lehman’s financial statements and whether Lehman’s executives behaved ethically. To answer these
questions, an examination is made of Generally Accepted Accounting Standards, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Institute of Management Accountants standards. Our findings suggest that Lehman behaved
unethically. Implications of our findings are discussed and suggestions are made for future research.
INTRODUCTION
On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment banking firm in the United
States filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This filing resulted in a 93% plunge in Lehman’s stock from its
previous close on September 12, 2008 and led to more than $46 billion of Lehman’s market value. This
information is detailed in a 2200 page report filed by a bankruptcy court (United States Bankruptcy Court
Southern District of New York In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, et al. Debtors, Chapter 11 Case No.
08-13555 (JMP) – Report of Anton R. Valukas, Bankruptcy Examiner). At that time, Lehman allegedly
had $639 billion in assets and $619 billion in debt. These amounts made it the largest bankruptcy filing in
history and caused Lehman to become the largest victim of the sub-prime mortgage crisis. This
bankruptcy rocked the fabric of global society. It intensified the financial crisis and contributed to the
erosion of almost $10 trillion in market capitalization from the global capital markets in October 2008.
Soon after its demise, the news of Lehman’s use of Repo 105 came to light. As a result, on April 29,
2010, a class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of the purchasers of the securities of Lehman Brothers
against three members of the senior executives of Lehman Brothers, including the Chief Executive
Officer, Richard Fuld. The suit alleges that the executives failed to disclose their use of controversial
accounting technique and misrepresented Lehman’s financial position which resulted in a falsely inflated
market price of the firm’s securities (New York Times, Reuters, June 4, 2010). Repo 105 allowed
Lehman to receive cash in exchange for their assets which was used to pay down their liabilities and
temporarily show less leverage and appear healthier in the eyes of investors, creditors and other interested
parties. Immediately after the publication of their quarterly financial statements and armed with this
favorable financial picture of their balance sheet, Lehman went into the open market and secured loans.
The proceeds would then be used to repurchase the assets at 105 percent of the cash amount received.

44

Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics vol. 8(5) 2011

During the Bankruptcy Trial of Lehman Brothers in April 2010, Mr. Richard S. Fuld, Jr., the former CEO
was questioned about the accounting technique that helped Lehman mask billions of dollars of troubled
assets and liabilities on its books. He however, denies any deliberate wrongdoing. The failure of Lehman
Brothers and the crisis that occurred in the subprime mortgage market has led to public outcry against
mortgage lending practices. It has also raised the question of the adequacy of the use of accounting
practices by investment banking institutions to account for their mortgage transactions which made their
financial statements appear better than they actually were.
OBJECTIVES OF PAPER
The Repo 105 transactions were increasingly employed by Lehman in 2007 and 2008 and always
increased just prior to the quarterly reporting periods so as to show favorable quarterly reports.
Additionally, these were material transactions and had the ability to affect the decision of a prudent
person. Nevertheless, Lehman failed to disclose these transactions in the notes to their financial
statements and in their required filings to the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC). These
transactions were recorded on the books of Lehman Brothers as sales. The question is as follows: Should
Lehman’s transactions have been recorded as sales or were these transactions simply secured financing
arrangements and should have been recorded as loans and shown on Lehman’s balance sheet as
liabilities? To answer this question, an examination of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) and requirements with respect to these types of transactions is undertaken. In addition, an
examination of Lehman’s responsibilities to its investors, creditors and the general public is undertaken
and a determination made of whether these responsibilities were met. Additionally, the CEO, Mr. Fuld
signed off on Lehman’s financial statements yet he denied that he misled investors on these materially
misstated transactions. Hence, the responsibility of financial executives in relation to the Sarbanes Oxley
Act of 2002 is examined. Further, Lehman’s behavior in relation to the standards prescribed by the
Institute of Management Accountants (IMA) is examined and a determination made of whether the
executives of Lehman Brothers behaved unethically. Furthermore, we suggest future research and
examine future policies that can possibly be utilized to circumvent the use of aggressive accounting
techniques that could possibly mislead investors.
BACKGROUND OF LEHMAN BROTHERS
For 158 years, Lehman Brothers was one of the biggest, most admired and most consistently
profitable investment banking firms on Wall Street. However, their involvement in the subprime
mortgages served as the beginning of their downfall. During the housing boom, Lehman acquired several
mortgage lenders including Aurora Loan Services, a company which specialized in making loans to
borrowers without full documentation. From 2005 to 2007, business in these mortgages resulted in record
revenues and caused the performance and growth rate of Lehman to surpass that of its investment banking
industry counterparts. However, in 2007, homeowners were unable to pay their mortgage obligations and
the housing market began to crumble (Jeffers & Yang, 2008). This resulted in a rapid increase in
delinquencies. Investment banking firms like Lehman were forced to write down billions of dollars of
debt. These bad loans put a huge dent on the balance sheet of these firms. At the same time, the rating
agencies began to focus on the balance sheet and financial leverage ratios of the investment banking firms
(Hughes & Jeffers). However, unfortunately for Lehman, the massive amounts of acquisitions and the
aggressive expansion strategy that had been employed by them in 2006 had resulted in extremely high
financial leverage ratios. An examination of Lehman’s condition by the rating agencies would have
revealed unacceptably high leverage levels. This poor condition would have resulted in a downgrade of
the company and would have led to a decline in the price of Lehman’s stock price. This would also have
had a negative impact on Lehman’s ability to acquire financing as well as resulted in other deleterious
consequences for the company. To address this issue and prevent a rating downgrade by the rating
agencies, Lehman needed to sell some of its assets or raise additional capital. However, since there was
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no ready market for these mortgage assets compounded with the fact that these assets were valued in the
market at far less than they were on its books, selling these assets was not a viable option. Hence, Lehman
embarked on an alternative strategy to shore up its balance sheet and hide its poor leverage and risky
position from the eyes of rating agencies, investors, creditors, regulators and other financial statement
users and monitors. This strategy became known as Repo 105.
WHAT IS REPO 105?
Repurchase agreement (repo) transactions have historically been used by companies to manage their
short term needs for cash but in Lehman’s case, these transactions took on an unusual spin that were
designed to make Lehman’s balance sheet appear to look healthier than they actually were. Traditional
repurchase transactions normally involve an investment banking firm giving a counterparty highly liquid
securities in exchange for cash. These are simply financing arrangements and are accounted for as loans
with collateral. As such, if the investment bank is unable to repay the loan, the lender sells the assets and
gets its money back. The cash received by the company is normally repaid at a later date plus a small
amount of interest (normally 2 percent) to get the securities back. Additionally these transactions would
generally be accounted for as financing arrangements.
To maintain its stellar reputation, Lehman engaged in this common arrangement but instead of
utilizing the normal practices, Lehman employed creative but deceitful accounting practices known as
Repo 105. Essentially, Repo 105 is an aggressive and deceitful accounting off-balance sheet device which
was used to temporarily remove securities and troubled liabilities from Lehman’s balance sheet while
reporting its quarterly financial results to the public. These transactions were recorded as sales rather than
as loans.
Steps in Lehman’s Repo 105 Transactions
The steps involved the purchase of bonds through a Special Financing Unit and intercompany
transactions with a London Affiliate. It worked as follows as adapted from (Wilchins, Dan & DaSilva,
Silvio, 2010):
Step 1: Lehman Brothers bought a government bond from another bank using its Lehman
Brothers Special Financing unit in the United States.
Step 2: Just before the end of the quarter, the U.S. unit transferred bonds to a London affiliate,
known as Lehman Brothers International (Europe).
Step 3: The London affiliate gave assets to its counterparty and received cash and agreed to buy
back the assets at the beginning of the next quarter at a higher price. Essentially, the assets given
were at least 105 percent of the cash received.
Step 4: The monies received were then used to pay off a large amount of Lehman’s liabilities.
Step 5: The reduction of assets and liabilities now showed healthier quarterly financial statements
and the corresponding leverage and other risk ratios. These healthy ratios were then issued to the
regulators, investors and the general public.
Step 6: At the beginning of the quarter and armed with these healthy financial statements,
Lehman then went to banking and other lending institutions and obtained loans.
Step 7: A few days later, Lehman Brothers Holding would repurchase the securities from their
London Affiliate at 105 percent of the values of the assets. Lehman’s assets and liabilities would
grow accordingly and the company’s leverage would spike back up and its balance sheet and
would return to its true inferior position less the 5 percent interest paid.
These transactions usually occurred for a period of seven to ten days around the end of the quarter
and created a materially misleading picture of the firm’s financial condition. In this accounting maneuver,
Lehman would obtain a short term cash loan from its counterparty in exchange for its assets. Lehman
would then record this transaction as a sale, when in fact it was simply a secured financing arrangement.
Since this was only borrowing money, Lehman should have kept the assets on its books. However, they
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did not follow proper accounting rules and instead they removed the troubled assets from their books and
recorded the transaction as a sale. The proceeds obtained from these “alleged” sales were used to pay
down liabilities. Hence, on the quarterly financial reporting date, Lehman would show a balance sheet
composed of less risky assets, less debt and possibly more cash. To outsiders, it appeared as if Lehman
was less leveraged and in really great condition. This resulted in the appearance of healthy financial
statements and the related healthy financial leverage and other risk ratios. In fact, the bankruptcy
Examiner showed that Lehman temporarily reported a net leverage ratio of 15.4 when it should have been
17.3 if it had not used Repo 105.
Importance of Financial Leverage
A favorable financial leverage means that the company is earning a return on borrowed funds that
exceeds the cost of borrowing the funds. The proportion of debt to shareholders equity in the capital
structure of a company is of interest to shareholders since a higher debt level means higher risk to
shareholders. However, earning a higher return on borrowed funds that exceed the cost of borrowing the
funds provides a company’s shareholders with higher return than by using equity funds alone (Spiceland,
2011). However, companies must adequately manage their combination of debt to equity in order to not
take on too much risk. Lehman Brothers did not adequately manage this financial leverage and took on
considerable risk. To hide its unhealthy situation, Lehman resorted to the use of Repo 105 transactions.
To demonstrate the impact of Repo 105 transactions on selected debt ratios and the related improvement
on the financial statements, the following hypothetical example is illustrated below.
Hypothetical Example of Repo 105
Assume that ABC Company received $50 billion of cash from its counterparty and transferred $50
billion of assets. If this transaction is recorded as a sale as done under Repo 105, instead of as a secured
loan then the following entry would be made:
a) Dr. Cash (Balance Sheet (B/S))
$50 billion
Cr. Assets (B/S)
$50 billion
An additional debit or credit will also be made here to recognize a gain or loss and taken to the income
statement.
The cash received is immediately used to pay down $50 billion of long term liabilities. Thus the
following entry is made:
b) Dr. Long-term liabilities (B/S)
$50 billion
Cr. Cash (B/S)
$50 billion
Accounting rules permit a short term liability for which the company has the intent and ability to
refinance to long term to be classified as long-term on the balance sheet. However, with such poor asset
quality and without a market for its assets compounded with poor credit ratings, it is unlikely that Lehman
would have been able to refinance their short term debt, thus this transaction should have been
appropriately recorded as a short term loan. In addition, the company is required to disclose in the notes to
the financial statements the nature and amounts of assets that had been pledged as collateral for the loan.
If the transaction was properly accounted for and recorded as a secured short term financing to be repaid
immediately after the quarterly financial reporting period, then the following entries would have been
made.
c) Dr. Cash (B/S)
$50 billion
Cr. Short Term Notes Payable (B/S)
$50 billion
d) Dr. Long-term Note Payable (B/S)
$50 billion
Cr. Cash (B/S)
$50 billion
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In addition, assume the following balance sheet information for ABC Company, and that the
company also had $10 billion of other income from operations. Column 1 shows the position if the
company did not use Repo 105. Column 2 shows the information if Repo 105 was used and the
transaction incorrectly accounted for as a sale. Column 3 shows the correct information if the proper
accounting had been used.
Column 1
Column 2
Column 3
Not Used Repo 105
Using Repo 105
Should Be This
Current assets
$50 billion 50(a)(50)(b) $50 billion 50(c)(50)(d) $50 billion
$450 billion
$450 billion
Long Term assets
$450 billion (50)(a)
Total Assets
$500 billion
$500 billion
$500 billion
Current liabilities
$ 20 billion
$20 billion 50(c)
$70 billion
Long Term Liabilities $180 billion (50)(b)
$130 billion (50)(d)
$130 billion
Total liabilities
$200 billion
$150 billion
$200 billion
Common Stock
$300 billion
$300 billion
$300 billion
$110 billion 7.5(f)
$107.5 billion
Retained Earnings
$100 billion 10(e)
Total S/Equity
$400 billion
$410 billion 7.5(f)
$407.5 billion
Net income
$ 10 billion 0
$10 billion (2.5)(f)
$7.5 billion
(a) Repo 105 - The cash is received from the counterparty in exchange for the alleged sale of
their long term assets (which are removed from the company’s books).
(b) Repo 105 - The cash received from the alleged sale is used to pay down liabilities (which are
removed from the company’s books).
(c) If correct accounting was used then transaction should be a secured loan. The cash is received
in exchange for a short term liability (note payable).
(d) The cash received is used to pay down liabilities.
(e) Increase due to net income from normal operations.
(f) Additional 5 percent interest expense that should have been accrued if the Repo 105
transaction had been properly recorded as a loan ($50 billion x 5% = $2.5 billion interest
expense). This would reduce the net income and retained earnings from $10 billion - $2.5
billion = $7.5 billion.
Analysis of Ratios
Using the above information from columns 2 and 3, an examination is made of the impact of the use
of Repo 105 on 5 selected risk ratios. These are a liquidity ratio, 2 leverage ratios, a profitability ratio and
an activity ratio.
1. Liquidity Ratio
The current ratio shows whether the company has enough liquidity to pay its current liability. It
measures a company’s short term debt paying ability. It compares a company’s obligations that
will shortly become due with the company’s cash and other assets that are expected to shortly be
converted to cash and offer some indication as to the ability of the company to pay its short term
debts. It is calculated as: Current assets/Current liabilities. If the transaction is recorded as a sale,
then the current ratio would be = $50/$20 = 2.5 to 1. However, if it was correctly recorded, then it
would only be $50/$70 = .71.
2. Financial Leverage ratio
Financial leverage measures the extent to which a firm has been financed by debt in relation to
equity. Stockholders desire a certain amount of leverage since it can lead to potentially higher
returns. However, if leverage is too high, then creditors become concerned about the potential for
default of the company’s debt. Thus companies must strategically optimize their use of leverage,
activity and profitability to achieve the optimal return on equity while at the same time
minimizing their risk. In Lehman’s case, the optimum combination of leverage was not
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appropriately managed nor achieved. Hence, at the end of each quarter, Lehman embarked on the
Repo 105 transactions to deceive the rating agencies, their creditors, investors and others. The net
effect of the transaction just prior to the end of each quarter would be that both sides of the
balance sheet would be shrunk. This would result in a significant temporary reduction in the
leverage reported.
a. Debt to Equity ratio:
The most common leverage ratio is the Debt to Equity ratio. It is a financial leverage
ratio that measures the extent to which a firm has been financed by debt. It compares
resources provided by creditors with resources provided by owners. It is calculated as
Total liabilities/Shareholders’ Equity. Using the Repo 105 technique, then this ratio
would be $150/$410= 36.59%. However if it was recorded correctly as a secured loan,
then the correct ratio would be $200/$407.5 = 49.08%.
b. Liabilities to Total Assets Ratio:
Another ratio that can be utilized to calculate leverage is to compare the total liabilities to
total assets. This is calculated as total liabilities/total assets. Under Repo 105, the ratio
would be $150/$500 = 30%. However, if the proper accounting procedure was used, then
it would be $200/$500 = 40%.
3. Profitability ratio
Another ratio that is of interest to stockholders is the return on equity ratio (ROE). This shows
the relationship between risk and profitability. As such, it measures the company’s financial
profitability to stockholders. Using Repo 105, the return on equity ratio would be income of $10
on Equity of $410 ($10/$410) = 2.44%. However, the actual return on equity ratio should have
been income of $7.5 on equity of $407.5 ($7.5/$407.5) = 1.84%. Using Repo 105, this ROE ratio
erroneously implied that the company was experiencing an aggressive growth rate.
4. Activity Ratio
A ratio that shows how well a company is managing and utilizing its assets is the Return on
Assets. It is calculated as Net Income/Total Assets. Using Repo 105, the ratio would be
$10/$500 = 2.0%. However, if the correct accounting methodology had been used, then it would
only be $7.5/$500 = 1.5%.
Summary of Ratios
Using Repo 105
Current Ratio
Debt to Equity Ratio
Liabilities to total assets
Return on Equity
Return on Assets

2.5
36.59%
30.0%
2.44%
2.0%

Using Correct
Accounting
.71
49.08%
40.0%
1.84%
1.5%

The above summary of the results show that by using Repo 105, all of these ratios are significantly
overstated than if the proper accounting procedures had been followed. The 2.5 times current ratio shows
that the company has 2.5 times as many current assets to current liabilities and can meet it current
liabilities when they become due plus have additional working capital. However, in reality the company
has less than $1 (only $.71) of current assets for every dollar of current liabilities. The Debt to Equity
ratio shows that the company is not highly leveraged and has a low level of debt (36.59%) in relationship
to equity when in fact it is currently at 49.08% and the Liabilities to total assets show 30% when in reality
it is 40%. Additionally, both the ROE and the ROA ratios overstate the company’s profitability and asset
utilization.
An examination of the ratios when the hypothetical company uses the Repo 105 technique shows that
the company is well capitalized and less risky. These ratios are totally misleading and mask the high

Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics vol. 8(5) 2011

49

leverage, riskiness, the low profitability and poor asset utilization of the firm. If creditors knew of this
situation then they may get worried and demand that the company pay some of its debt back by selling its
assets. This is a situation that Lehman Brothers did not want. When using Lehman’s Repo 105
techniques, we see that all of their ratios are overstated. Hence we can conclude that these overstated
ratios result in an inaccurate interpretation of the financial position of the hypothetical company and
would result in misleading financial statements.
Use of Misleading Financial Statements by Lehman
Armed with its healthy but false financial statements, Lehman obtained loans from financial
institutions. However, the obligation to buy back the collateral (troubled mortgage loans) remained with
Lehman. Thus, immediately after the financial statements were issued, the company would use the cash
obtained from the loans and buy back its original troubled assets at 105 percent of their value. This means
that Lehman paid a 5 percent interest rate rather than the normal 2 percent (hence the classification by
Lehman as Repo 105). After the repurchase of the troubled assets, Lehman’s leverage would spike back
up again and its balance sheet would be brought back to its true inferior position (less the 5 percent paid
to repurchase their troubled assets). The impact of the Repo 105 transactions allowed the firm to remove
approximately $50 billion of bad assets at the end of its first and second quarters of 2008. This amount is
extremely material and allowed Lehman to present a superior balance sheet to the public and appear to be
extremely healthy. Anton R. Valukas, Lehman’s bankruptcy examiner stated that Lehman’s failure to
disclose the use of its accounting device to significantly and temporarily lower its leverage, at the same
time that it affirmatively represented those “low leverage” numbers to investors as positive news, created
a misleading portrayal of Lehman’s true financial health. This was significant especially since this was at
a time when the general public and financial markets were already extremely nervous. These deceitful
window dressing practices deceived investors, creditors, and other interested parties and led to huge
losses to investors and others who put their faith as well as their wealth in Lehman.
DID LEHMAN VIOLATE GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES?
Over the years, numerous ways have been developed for companies to use their accounts and notes
receivables to obtain immediate cash. This is known as factoring of receivables. The use of factoring
allows companies to receive cash immediately without waiting for their customers to pay their
obligations. The methods of accounting for these transactions are dependent on which rights and risks are
retained by the company who originally held the receivables (transferor). Transferors usually prefer to
account for these transactions as sales rather than as secured borrowings because the sale approach makes
the transferor seem less leveraged, more liquid, and often more profitable than does the secured
borrowing approach as shown in the example above.
A company is permitted under Accounting Rule SFAS 140 - Accounting for Transfers and Servicing
of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of Liabilities to account for these transactions as sales when the
transferor surrenders control over the assets transferred. Sometimes surrender of control is clear and is
deemed to be when the receivable is sold without recourse and without any other rights, continuing
servicing or other involvement by the transferor. At other times, surrender of control is not clear. This
cloudiness in the qualifications as to whether the transaction is allowed to be accounted for as a sale or
just as a loan with recourse permitted companies to structure transactions in ways that qualified them for
treatment as a sale but at the same time, they retained enough involvement to have control (Spiceland,
2011).
It is obvious that Lehman took advantage of this loophole in SFAS 140 in order to account for their
transactions as sales instead of as borrowing. Generally, if the value of the principal plus the fee related
to the factored security is between 98 percent and 102 percent of the borrowed amount, then the
transaction should be recorded for as a loan. However, if the principal plus the premium is less than 98
percent or greater than 102 percent of the amount borrowed, then the loan qualifies to be treated as a sale.
Lehman took advantage of this loophole by recording the Repo 105 transactions as sales when they had
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the intent to repurchase the assets immediately after the quarterly financial statements had been issued
and should therefore have been recorded as secured loans with recourse.
FASB’S RESPONSE TO CLOUDINESS IN ACCOUNTING FOR FACTORING OF
RECEIVABLES
When a company sells or uses its Receivables as collateral to receive cash, it is referred to as
factoring. To address this ambiguity in the accounting for factoring of receivables and constrain the
inappropriate use of the sale approach when control was not indeed transferred, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) issued SFAS 166 – Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets to amend
SFAS 140 – Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishment of
Liabilities (AICPA Codification of Standards, 2010).
Accounting Standards
SFAS 166 stated that the transferor is determined to have surrendered control over the receivables if
and only if specific conditions are met. These are as follows:
a. The transferred assets have been isolated from the transferor – beyond the reach of the transferor
and its creditors.
b. Each transferee has the right to pledge or exchange the assets it received.
c. The transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets. Effective control
would exist, for example, if the transfer is structured such that the assets are likely to end up
being returned to the transferor.
The transferor is now permitted under SFAS 166 to account for the transfer of the assets as a sale if
and only if all three of the above conditions are met. However, if any of the three transactions are not met,
then the transferor must account for the transfer as a secured borrowing.
Since Lehman had the intent to repurchase the troubled assets immediately after the issuance of their
financial statements, then these transactions were simply secured borrowings and should not have been
recorded as sales but should have indeed been recorded as secured loans.
Required Disclosures Regarding Factoring of Receivables
Furthermore, these Repo 105 transactions were material and should therefore have been properly
disclosed by Lehman in their notes to their financial statements. Additionally, the terms of the transfer
with respect to rights or interests and obligations of the sales of the receivables should have been clearly
stated and the fact that the related assets in the Repo 105 transactions had been appropriately accounted
for and removed from the balance sheet. However, Lehman failed to disclose any information regarding
the sales of their receivables and other assets in these transactions.
Lehman’s failure to disclose the required information of the Repo 105 transactions in combination
with the financial crisis caused the FASB to significantly increase the requirements with respect to the
amount of disclosure for the sale or transfer of receivables especially in cases where the transferor may
still bear significant “risk” with the arrangement. Some of the additional requirements relate to both
quantitative and qualitative aspects. The transferring company is also required to disclose information
regarding the quality of the assets that were transferred. Examples of this would be the amount of
receivables that are past due and the credit losses occurring during the period. This information is
required to be disclosed in a manner that permits the average financial statement user to understand the
nature, amount and ongoing risks of the transfer (Spiceland, 2011).
DID LEHMAN COMMIT FRAUD BY USING REPO 105?
Lehman’s CEO, Mr. Fuld stated that he takes responsibility for his decisions but that they were made
with the information available to him at that time. Hence, Fuld is implying that although the financial
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statements were misleading, he did not engage in any wrong-doing with respect to their Repo 105
transactions. Failure to disclose an alleged material fact is a potential actionable fraud and does not
excuse a clear violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the SEC Act of 1933 and 1934 due to the omission
of material facts or misleading statements (Jeffers & Mogielnicki, 2010).
DID LEHMAN BROTHERS BEHAVE UNETHICALLY?
To make a determination of whether or not Lehman acted unethically, it is necessary to undertake an
examination of the Institute of Management (IMA’s) Standards as well as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.
The IMA’s Code of Conduct
The IMA’s Code of Conduct is applicable to not only management accountants but to managers and
executives of companies. This Code presents ethical standards that provide sound, practical advice and
was clearly applicable to the managers involved in the Lehman Brothers Repo 105 transactions. Thus,
these managers had a duty to abide by the IMA Standards. These standards are Competence,
Confidentiality, Integrity and Credibility. An examination of Lehman’s actions is undertaken with respect
to the 3rd and 4th standards (Integrity & Credibility).
Did Lehman Violate the Integrity Standard regarding Conflict of Interest?
The Integrity Standard states that each member has a responsibility to:
a. Mitigate actual conflicts of interest. Regularly communicate with business associates to avoid
apparent conflicts of interest. Advise all parties of any potential conflicts.
b. Refrain from engaging in any conduct that would prejudice carrying out duties ethically.
c. Abstain from engaging in or supporting any activity that might discredit the profession
(Brewer, Garrison & Noreen, 2010).
Lehman’s investors and other relevant parties were not advised of the questionable accounting
practices of Repo 105. The hiding of the toxic assets and liabilities combined with the favorable financial
statements released to investors each quarter clearly deceived investors and the general public. It showed
a favorable and healthy Lehman Brothers when in fact the company was in poor financial condition. This
action clearly misrepresented the financial position of Lehman and resulted in an inflation of the market
price of the firm’s securities. In addition, the favorable financial statements produced by Lehman Brothers
resulted in many of its senior executives benefiting greatly by receiving huge compensation, bonuses and
stock grants. These actions are clearly violations of the IMAs standard of Integrity.
Did Lehman Violate the Credibility Standard Related to Disclosure?
The Credibility Standard states that each member has a responsibility to:
a. Communicate information fairly and objectively.
b. Disclose all relevant information that could reasonably be expected to influence an intended
user’s understanding of the reports, analyses, or recommendations.
c. Disclose delays or deficiencies in information, timeliness, processing, or internal controls in
conformance with organization policy and/or applicable law (Brewer, Garrison & Noreen,
2010).
Lehman failed to disclose the Repo 105 transactions as noteworthy events or transactions. U.S.
GAAP requires a company to disclose significant events that are potentially important to the
company’s financial statements. These Repo 105 transactions were clearly material and had the potential
to impact the decision of reasonable users, however, no information regarding them were disclosed. Repo
105 was relevant, material and could reasonably be expected to influence the understanding, analyses,
recommendations and decisions of intended users, yet it was not disclosed to the clients or to the public.
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Investment advisors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of their clients, investors and other
users. However, Lehman did not do so. Hence an examination of the facts indicates that the behavior of
Lehman’s managers indeed violated the IMAs Credibility standard.
Did Lehman Violate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act?
The Sarbanes-Oxley of 2002 was enacted in response to a host of unethical acts by companies.
Among other things, the Act requires CFOs and CEOs to personally certify that the financial statements
and company disclosures present fairly the financial position of the company. If the financial statements
are found to contain material misstatements, these financial executives are subject to severe financial
penalties and imprisonment. If Lehman’s CEO and CFO knew of the Repo 105 transactions and knew
that they caused the financial statements to be misleading, then under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, they may
face criminal charges. From all accounts, it appears as if Lehman’s senior financial executives knew of
the Repo 105 transactions. Nevertheless, they certified the accuracy of Lehman’s financial statements
without the appropriate disclosures despite having full knowledge that the company had engaged in the
use of inappropriate transactions and accounting manipulations to hide their assets and liabilities and as a
result it made their financial statements appear to be in good health when indeed they were in poor
condition. As a result, these executives were fully aware that the financial statements were misleading and
did not fairly present the true position of the company. Hence, these Lehman executives may be subject to
criminal and financial liability.
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS
Our findings have many implications as follows:
1. Lehman’s use of Repo 105 may have significantly contributed in some manner to the subsequent
bankruptcy of one of the biggest and most well-respected investment banking companies in the
world. This has been followed by numerous lawsuits and has raised the question of the
responsibility of financial executives to investors and creditors. This suggests that there is no such
thing as too big to fail. Thus all firms (big and small) have a responsibility to conduct themselves
with the highest degree of integrity.
2. Our findings have also raised the question of the appropriateness of accounting principles. This
also led to FASBs revision of the accounting requirements for factoring of receivables as sales or
loans. What needs to be determined is how widespread similar conventions were in effect for
hiding toxic assets and liabilities by other investment firms.
3. The failure of Lehman to disclose the details related to the Repo 105 transaction to their investors
and creditors was an omission of a material fact. This also leads to additional questions: a) Had
investors known of Lehman’s Repo 105 transactions, would they have declined to continue to
conduct business with Lehman? b) Did the investors in fact rely upon omissions and affirmative
untrue statements to their obvious detriment? c) If creditors knew of the poor financial health of
Lehman, would they have still extended loans to the firm? d) Did the statements and course of
conduct of Lehman’s executives represent half-truths or were they patently false?
4. It is clear that the conduct of Lehman may not just be unethical but may indeed have risen to the
level of actionable fraud under the law.
5. This study has also raised the question of the role of auditors to find and disclose material
transactions that may lead to misstatements and their responsibility to protect the public.
6. Lack of appropriate regulation and oversight may have contributed to the ensuing dilemma of the
sub-prime meltdown, resulting in the bankruptcy of Lehman, the financial collapse and loss of
jobs and income for many Americans. Government did step in by providing a financial bail-out
for many other firms in order to prevent a collapse of the industry after defaults in the housing
market ran rampant and foreclosures and bankruptcies rose dangerously high. There is no
question, though, that future generations will pay dearly for the negative effects of irresponsible
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and unethical behavior as in the case of Lehman’s use of Repo 105 and the use of questionable
accounting practices that lead to the issuance of misleading financial statements.
FUTURE RESEARCH
One area of concern relates to the reliance on the use of several accounting techniques that were used
by Lehman’s British affiliate that were not acceptable in the U.S. Various e-mails suggest that Lehman’s
executives knew that they were the only ones using these techniques but were content to use innovative
techniques to cook their books. This raises the question of the appropriateness of the use of nontraditional accounting techniques and the disclosures that are required in order not to mislead investors,
creditors and other financial statement users.
Another area that needs further investigation is the role that the auditors played in these Repo 105
transactions. Even though Lehman’s auditors, Ernst & Young did not audit a Repo 105 transaction, it is
obvious that these transactions were not normal accounting practices. To this end, Lehman’s auditors had
a duty to conduct more tests to assess the impact of their use on Lehman’s financial statements. They also
had a duty to insist that management disclose these transactions in their notes to the financial statements.
Executives are responsible for the fairness of their companies’ financial statements. Yet, there are
many cases of violations of the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Will corporate executives be held accountable and
sent to jail for their role in the global financial meltdown and will they be required to pay back their
unearned bonuses and other compensation when it is found that losses and not profits were sustained by
their companies and their financial statements were materially misstated?
CONCLUSION
The use of Repo 105 by Lehman Brothers to hide their assets and liabilities from the public and show
a favorable financial position has raised the question of the legal and ethical duties of fiduciaries to their
clients and the public. Repo 105 constituted a conflict of interest and serious breaches of ethical conduct.
In the interest of fairness, investors have a right to know the true condition of the company in which they
are investing. In this paper, an examination is made of the use of Repo 105. Our findings suggest that
Lehman acted unethically by violating the Integrity and Credibility standards of the IMAs Code of
Conduct in its use of Repo 105 transactions. They also violated the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 by stating that the financial statements were fairly stated when indeed they were misleading.
We also find that Lehman engaged in conflict of interest activities and failed to adequately protect their
investors. The ultimate decision regarding Lehman’s liability and possible criminal culpability with
respect to the alleged abuses in their use of Repo 105 and their eventual bankruptcy will be decided by the
U.S. Courts. If these abuses are found to be real and egregious, one must wonder when businesses and
their executives will realize that their activities can significantly impact the very fabric of human society.
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